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10.1  Introduction 
The theory of industrial organization  has exerted a strong influence on trade 
theory and commercial policy in recent years. At a theoretical level, the wel- 
fare implications of trade policy in the presence of unexploited economies of 
scale, exit and entry barriers, and oligopolistic markets are now better under- 
stood. Concurrent with the flow of  new theoretical contributions,‘ a number 
of case studies, mostly partial equilibrium, have sought to evaluate the welfare 
and  resource allocation effects of  trade liberalization in  sectors like autos 
where the above characteristics are an important feature of industrial organi- 
zation.2 Most case studies have been for developed countries, yet it is in de- 
veloping countries, particularly the emerging so-called semi-industrial coun- 
tries, that the interaction of unexploited economies of  scale and oligopolistic 
market structures is likely to be greate~t.~ 
A case in  point is the Republic of  Korea. Following a drive to develop 
heavy  and chemical industries in the rnid-l970s, Korea found itself with an 
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I. Early contributions include Corden (1967) and Snape (1977). Major contributions in the new 
literature are surveyed in  Helpman and Krugman (1985, 1989), and in the edited volumes by 
Kierkowski (1984) and Krugman (1988). For a recent survey, see Harris (1989). 
2. See, for example, Dixit (1988) and Smith and Venables (1988). 
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Tyers (1988), Devarajan and Rodrik (1989a, 1989b), and Condon and de Melo (1991). 
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extremely concentrated domestic industrial structure in the early 1980s, when 
it  embarked on cautious trade liberalization. Government policies had  not 
only erected entry barriers into those sectors in the hands of  conglomerates 
but also conferred a high level of protection from import competition. In many 
ways Korea resembles the ideal case so often referred to in the recent research 
on trade policy in imperfectly competitive environments. Indeed the evidence 
we review in this paper indicates that protection in sectors with unexploited 
economies of scale erected entry barriers, which in turn allowed firms to ex- 
ploit market power. What then would be the effects of  an across-the-board 
trade liberalization in this environment? 
In this paper,  we  apply a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
developed in de Melo and Tarr (forthcoming) to assess the welfare and re- 
source allocation effects of  trade liberalization in Korea. A CGE model is 
particularly relevant for such an exercise because of  the relatively high and 
dispersed protection in the Korean economy and because of the importance of 
economies of  scale in  several sectors. Our calculations are derived from a 
seven-sector model calibrated to 1982, a year that has especially good protec- 
tion estimates. Three sectors-consumer  goods, producer goods, and heavy 
industry-are  calibrated to increasing returns to scale (IRTS). In some simu- 
lations, in line with the empirical evidence, we allow these sectors to earn 
supernormal profits when  protected. To  anticipate our results,  the welfare 
gains from a move to free trade reach up to 10 percent of GDP, an estimate 
tenfold larger than the corresponding gains under constant returns to scale 
(CRTS). Even if, when protected, these sectors cannot earn above normal 
profits, our estimates of the welfare gains reach up to 5 percent of GDP. 
Our results stand in sharp contrast to other estimates of the costs of protec- 
tion, one exception being the work of Harris (1984) on Canada. To judge the 
plausibility of these results, one must question whether our model of the Ko- 
rean industrial organization structure is a reasonable one. Therefore, in  sec- 
tion 10.2 we go into some detail on recent Korean industrial organization and 
industrial policies, as we believe they provide good support for our modeling 
of  trade policy in the Korean environment. Section 10.3 discusses our mod- 
eling of imperfectly competitive markets and how we calibrated the model to 
1982 data. Results are in section 10.4 and conclusions follow in section 10.5. 
10.2  Bade Policies, Industrial Structure, and Industrial Organization 
Policies in Korea 
Until the move to a sectoral development strategy focusing on heavy and 
chemical industries (HCIs) between 1973 and 1979, Korea’s outward-oriented 
strategy was predicated on superior organizational ability and emphasis in de- 
velopment  of  labor-intensive activities.  During  this  early phase  (prior to 
1973), Korea’s innovative policies included a rationalized exchange rate re- 
gime,  strong  export  incentives,  selective  import  liberalization,  directed 289  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
credit, and a host of finely tuned export promotion instruments. A key feature 
of that phase was high protection of the domestic market in industries in which 
Korea did not face favorable international prospects, combined with low pro- 
tection in industries where Korean products were competitive. As  a result, 
unlike many other countries following an active industrialization strategy, Ko- 
rea offered little incentive for industries producing exportables to keep them 
at home. Examples of heavily protected sectors (effective protection rates for 
1968  in  parenthesis) were transport equipment (163 percent), durable con- 
struction (64 percent), and machinery (44  percent). 
The shift toward HCIs was achieved by directing to these sectors up to four- 
fifths of manufacturing investment credit, usually at preferential rates, by pro- 
viding  protection,  and  by  encouraging the  development of  conglomerates 
(“Jaebol”). These policies recognized that most industries favored by the HCI 
drive have large economies of  scale and hence that efficient production im- 
plied capacities well beyond the scale of the domestic market. However, this 
shift from a broad, export-led strategy toward a more typical sector orientation 
had  some undesirable side effects, including underutilized capacity and  a 
sharp decline in the incremental output-capital ratio, effects that eventually 
led to a return toward greater industrial neutrality and cautious import liberal- 
ization starting in  1979. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that the HCI 
drive achieved many objectives, including the target of 50 percent of export 
sales for the HCIs and the successful transition to an economy fully based on 
modem technology by  a leapfrog strategy with respect to technological re- 
quirements during the HCI dr~ve.~ 
A legacy of the HCI drive, however, has been an extremely concentrated 
industrial structure by  international standards (see table 10.1, panel A). For 
example, in 1982, the top fifty Korean firms accounted for 37 percent of total 
sales, while the corresponding figure for Japan is 27 percent for the top one 
hundred firms and for Taiwan 16 percent for the top fifty firms. Furthermore, 
the percentage of sales classified as “competitive” (three-firm concentration 
ratio less than 60 percent), which has been relatively low since 1970, declined 
as a result of  the HCI drive.5 
Various factors led to accelerated economic concentration. The introduction 
of  mass production techniques into a small domestic market at a relatively 
early stage of  development allowed conglomerates to accumulate stocks of 
superior human and physical capital while they were protected from domestic 
and international competition by various institutional barriers erected to limit 
new entry into the market. In addition, sometimes the government’s economic 
policy intensified concentration. During the HCI drive, overlapping invest- 
ment was prevented in the most important industrial branches. Furthermore, 
Lee, Urata, and Choi (1988) conclude that the protection and incentive poli- 
4. For further discussion of the HCI drive see World Bank (1987). 
5. The market share of the twenty leading Jaebol continued to rise until the early 1980s. 290  Jaime de Melo and David Roland-Holst 
Table 10.1  Commodity Market Structure and Performance in Korean 
Manufacturing 
~~  ~~  ~ 
A. Commodity Market Structure, 1982’ 
Monopoly  Duopoly  Oligopoly  Competitive  Total 
Number of  533  25 1  1,071  405  2260 
Sales  5,649  3,275  24,967  15,481  49,372 
commodities  (23.6)  (11.1)  (47.4)  (17.9)  (100) 
(billion won)  (11.4)  (6.6)  (50.6)  (31.4)  (100) 
B. Performance of  Different Market Structures (average of  1978  and 1983) 
High  Low 
Monopoly/  Less  Export  Export 
Oligopoly  Competitive  Protected  Protected  Share  Share 
Price cost  29.0  26.0  34.0  24.0  25.0  29.0 
marginb 
(mean) 
Note: Monopoly if CRI > 80  percent, SIIS2 <I  10; duopoly if CR2  > 80 percent, SUS2  < 5, S3 
< 5  percent; oligopoly if CR3 > 60  percent (monopoly and duopoly excluded); competitive if 
CR3 > 60 percent, where CRi inicates i-firm concentration ratio, and Si indicates area of largest 
ith firm. 
Source: K. Lee, S. Urata, and I. Choi, “Recent Developments in industrial organization in Ko- 
rea,” World Bank Working Paper (Washington, D.C., 1988),  tables 3  and 8. 
uNumbers in parentheses are percentages; totals sum to 100. 
bPercent; PCM is calculated as value of sales less labor costs divided by value of sales ( X  100). 
cies, including taxation, banking, and commercial policy measures, operated 
almost exclusively to the advantage of the conglomerates. 
Many observers of Korea agree that conglomerates exercise market power 
on domestic sales.  However, the data in table  10.1, panel B, suggest that 
sectors competing in  international markets  (i.e., sectors with  high  export 
shares and/or low rates of protection) price more competitively.6  One way of 
finding out if  this is so is by  cross-section regressions linking performance 
with structure. Such regressions, traditionally carried out by  industrial orga- 
nization economists, attempt to isolate the effects of industry structure on sec- 
toral average price-cost margin (PCMs) after controlling for other factors af- 
fecting the PCM,  such as differences  in technology  across sectors. In  the 
Korean case, estimates by Lee, Urata, and Choi (1988) for sixty-five manu- 
facturing sectors for  1983 show that,  after controlling for capital intensity, 
R&D expenditures (and other factors), the PCM  is positively (and  signifi- 
cantly) related to concentration.’ More interestingly, they also find a statisti- 
6.  Mean price-cost  margins (PCMs) for protected  sectors were a third higher than  for less 
protected sectors in 1982. 
7.  The positive correlation between PCM and concentration does not necessarily support the 
“structuralist view” that sees in this relationship rent-seeking behavior by  oligopolistic firms. It 291  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
cally significant negative correlation between PCMs and import shares in do- 
mestic  sales,  suggesting that  imports exert  a discipline on  the pricing  of 
domestic firms.*  These authors also note that the pace of import liberalization 
was accelerated in markets dominated by a few firms. 
Perhaps the most telling indication that regulation of  market structure be- 
came a major concern for Korean industrial policy comes from the vigorous 
enforcement of  the Monopoly Regulation Act of  1981. About 10 percent of 
firms designated by  the government as dominating their respective markets 
were accused of  having their market position. Administrative recommenda- 
tions and orders were issued to trade associations that had clauses permitting 
undue concerting activities in their articles of incorporation. Over two hun- 
dred cases in violation of  the provisions against unfair trade practices were 
leveled between  1981 and 1985. Moreover, 35 percent of the 2,600 applica- 
tions for international agreements during this period were judged to contain 
provisions restricting competition or involving unfair trade practices and had 
to be revised. 
Two stylized facts emerge from this discussion and from the data in table 
10.1. First,  Korea appears to have achieved a very concentrated industrial 
structure by  the early  1980s, as a legacy of  the HCI drive when industrial 
policy discouraged firm entry. Second, the evidence suggests that, after con- 
trolling for other factors, highly protected sectors were earning above normal 
profits. By creating barriers to entry, protection allowed conglomerates to ex- 
ercise market power. These stylized facts are incorporated in the model out- 
lined below. 
10.3.  Modeling Imperfectly Competitive Domestic Markets9 
On the basis of the evidence discussed above, we concentrate on modeling 
the implications of  imperfectly competitive behavior in domestic markets in 
sectors with IRTS. At the same time, in the absence of evidence to the con- 
trary, we assume that Korean exports are sold in competitive world markets. 
We  also assume that Korea is a small economy in the markets in which it 
trades.  This implies that there are no  induced  terms-of-trade  effects from 
changes in trade policy. While this small-country assumption may be debat- 
able for a few export markets in which Korea competes, it has the great advan- 
tage of simplifying the interpretation of welfare calculations and, in any case, 
could be relaxed without difficulty as in de Melo and Tm  (forthcoming). 
could also reflect the superior performance of large firms according to the “efficiency-based view.” 
However, in the case of Korea, evidence indicates that the efficiency of small and medium-sized 
firms had caught up with that of  large firms by the end of the 1970s. See Kim (1985). 
8. This result is known in the industrial organization literature as the “import discipline” hy- 
pothesis. See the symposia led by Caves (1980) and Geroski and Jacquemin (1981). 
9. For a fuller description of the model, see de Melo and Tam (forthcoming). 292  Jaime de Melo and David Roland-Holst 
Apart from the treatment of  imperfect competition discussed below,  the 
CGE model is quite standard. In this application two primary factors, labor 
and capital, are in fixed supply but mobile between sectors. Intersectoral mo- 
bility leads to equal rewards across sectors for each type of  factor. Domestic 
demand includes two components, final and intermediate. The government 
collects (and distributes in lump sum) revenues from tariff collection. 
Substitution possibilities in production and demand are summarized in fig- 
ure  10.1. Production possibilities are parametrized by  assuming CES func- 
tions for value-added  and  Leontief  functions between  intermediates (as a 
whole) and  value added,  as well as within intermediates. However, within 
each sector, intermediate demand is a CES function between the domestically 
produced intermediate and the competing foreign intermediate. To  give an 
example, no substitution in purchases is allowed between consumer goods 
and producer goods, but substitution in purchases is allowed between domes- 
tically produced consumer goods and foreign-produced consumer goods when 
their relative prices change as a result of a change in trade policy. Likewise in 
consumption demand, the demand system derived from the Stone-Geary util- 
ity indicator allows for nonunitary income elasticities of demand and nonzero 
cross-price  elasticities  of  demand  between  domestically  produced  and 
foreign-produced consumption good. 
Traded goods are imperfect substitutes by country of origin (CES assump- 
tion). In each sector, goods produced domestically are imperfect substitutes 
for imports. As in the case analyzed by Snape (1977), changes in trade policy 
will shift the demand curve of domestic firms. Likewise, goods supplied on 
the domestic market are imperfect substitutes for goods supplied for export 
(CET assumption). The implications of  this treatment of  foreign trade with 
production differentiation on the import and export sides is analyzed in greater 
detail in de Melo and Robinson (1989), where it is shown that the domestic 
country’s foreign offer curve has the usual shape. 
For sectors with IRTS, goods are produced by N,  identical firms. All goods 
produced for domestic sales in the same sector are perfect substitutes, allow- 
ing us to aggregate sectoral demand and supplies. The assumption that prod- 
uct differentiation is modeled at the national level rather than at the firm level 
has three implications for the welfare estimates reported below. First, because 
all domestic firms are identical and supply a homogeneous product, one can- 
not capture product variety and hence we  may underestimate the benefits of 
trade liberalization as additional product variety occurs. Second, the assump- 
tion of  national product differentiation implies that the domestic firms’ per- 
ceived elasticity of  demand (defined below in eq. [3]) only depends on the 
number of competing domestic firms rather than on the total number of com- 
peting firms in the world. Our numerical results, however, show that the value 
of  the perceived elasticity of  demand is quite insensitive to firm entry/exit. 
Third, the assumption of  national product differentiation implies that adjust- 
ment to achieve zero profits occurs by firm entry/exit. In the case of firm entry, 293  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
A.  SUBSTITUTION IN PRODUCTION 
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8.  SUBSTITUTION IN FINAL DEMAND 
Linear expenditure system (LES) 
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/__________ 
Consumption \  Consumption 
Domestic  Imported  Domestic  Imported 
Fig. 10.1  Model structure 
one gets market fragmentation that may overstate scale inefficiency.  lo If Ko- 
rean firms are indeed “small” in the market in which they compete, an  in- 
crease in the number of  Korean firms would have little effect on their demand. 
Hence adjustment to zero profits would occur by  an alternative mechanism. 
One possible adjustment is that which occurs when  incumbent firms price 
competitively, just covering average costs. 
In view of these implications of the national product differentiation assump- 
tion,  we  shall contrast two pricing hypotheses in IRTS sectors against the 
alternative of  CRTS where marginal cost pricing prevails. Furthermore, we 
10. For an approach that relies on product differentiation  at the firm level see Brown and Stem 
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shall consider for each pricing hypothesis the possibility that protection, by 
creating barriers to entry, allows for supernormal profits. 
10.3.1  Contestable Market Pricing 
In the first alternative, we specify an analogue to the case of perfect com- 
petition under CRTS. We assume costless entry/exit, so that the threat of entry 
forces incumbent firms to price at average cost. We  shall refer to this hypoth- 
esis as the contestable market pricing rule. Omitting sectoral subscripts: 
(1)  PX  = AC 
for each sector with IRTS, where PX is the weighted sum of  the unit sales 
prices on the domestic (PD)  and export (PE)  markets (recall that in the export 
market the unit sales price in domestic currency is determined by the exoge- 
nously given price in foreign currency times the exchange rate) and AC  is 
average costs. As shown below, this pricing rule represents only a small de- 
parture from competitive pricing and has the advantage of isolating the role of 
market structure from that of market conduct. 
10.3.2  Monopolistic Competition 
In  the second alternative, we  assume that each identical firm behaves in 
the  domestic market  as  a  monopolist facing  a  downward-sloping demand 
curve. In equilibrium, each firm equates marginal revenue with marginal costs, 
that is, 
PD-MC  l+Cl  -~  - 
PD  NE  ' 
where MC is marginal cost, PD is the unit price on domestic sales, and  C  is 
the representative firm's conjecture about the response of  competitors to its 
output decision with respect to firm j. That is, if  Q, denotes the aggregate 
output of  the remaining firms in its sector, then  fl = AQ,/AQj.  We  refer to 
this specification as the monopolistic competition  or exogenous conjectures 
case (to distinguish it from the variant below where conjectures are endoge- 
nous). 
For the functional forms selected to represent import demand and export 
supply, de Melo and Tarr (forthcoming) show that the perceived elasticity of 
demand facing each firm is given by 
(3) 
where SF  and Sv denote the shares of  final and intermediate goods in total 
demand, respectively, and  E  and  E " are functions of the parameters describ- 
ing substitution effects in intermediate and final demand. 
Expression (3), which is obtained by  differentiating the first-order condi- 
tions describing demand for domestic and imported goods, indicates that the 
perceived elasticity of demand is a share-weighted average of the price elastic- 295  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
ities of demand for final (C  F,  and intermediate (C ”) goods. Because the shares 
depend on quantities demanded that are themselves price-responsive, the per- 
ceived elasticity of demand is itself endogenous and will increase in response 
to trade liberalization. This implies that there is a “pro-competitive’’ effect of 
trade liberalization in the monopolistic competition model. 
Whereas the threat of  entry insures zero profits in  the contestable market 
alternative, in  the conjectural variation case we have to make assumptions 
about entry and exit. In one closure, we assume no entry/exit. One can think 
of this alternative as the short-run monopolistic competition case. In the other, 
which  is  more representative of  a long-run equilibrium, entry/exit ensures 
zero profits. Then the model also includes explicitly the zero profit condition 
(4)  Tr  = 0, 
where ~r is the profit rate. 
One might expect the degree of firm collusion to vary with the number of 
firms. The fewer the number of firms, the more collusive behavior is likely to 
be. Indeed, if N represents the number of firms, one would expect that R +  0 
as N +  ~0 so that firms behave competitively as N becomes large. In our case, 
N is an arbitrary number normalized to unity in the calibration. To capture the 
idea that firms’ conjectures depend on the number of firms, and, more impor- 
tant, to account for the fact that firm entry implies the availability of a larger 
number of varieties, we add the following equation to determine conjectures: 
C!  = AQ-j/AQj  = N-’. 
We  refer to this variant as the endogenous conjectures case. This means that, 
as firms enter (exit), incumbents adapt their conjectures and price more (less) 
competitively. Equation (5) can be viewed as a shortcut to account for product 
variety and the influence of the number of firms on behavior.  II 
10.3.3  Supernormal Profits 
In light of the evidence in section 10.2, we present a variant of the model 
in which protection allows for supernormal profit because of barriers to entry. 
Supernormal profits exist because of protection. This variant is applied to both 
pricing rules described above. In the presence of  supernormal profits, firms 
sell in the domestic market at a price PD > PD. The rate of  supernormal 
profit, +, per unit of domestic sales, is an exogenous parameter. Then, in the 
contestable market case, equation (1) is replaced by 
(1‘)  PX (FD,  PE) = AC  (1 + $), 
which is contestable for + = 0. In the conjectural variation case, equation (4) 
is replaced by 
11. While the conjectural variation approach is a convenient way of parametrizing oligopolistic 
behavior and suitable for a static simulation exercise, it is inadequate to study detailed interactions 
under dynamic oligopoly. For a critique of  the conjectural variation approach see Shapiro (1989). 296  Jaime de Melo and David Roland-Holst 
which sets the profit rate to its exogenously determined value. In the experi- 
ments reported below,  we  assume that  liberalization eliminates the market 
power of domestic firms in the domestic market. Therefore removing protec- 
tion entails concurrently setting + = 0 in equation (1’) or (4’). To control for 
the effect of entry/exit in the monopolistic competition case, we also run this 
specification with no entry/exit under both profitability scenarios. 
10.3.4  Data and Calibration 
In the application, we remove protection in a model where the economy is 
disaggregated into seven sectors. Table 10.2 gives the aggregation and struc- 
ture of production and final demand. The base case against which we contrast 
our various pricing  rules assumes constant returns to scale (CRTS) for all 
sectors. When we assume IRTS, three sectors have increasing returns: con- 
sumer goods, producer goods, and heavy industry. Together, these three sec- 
tors account for 42 percent of value added. Each of the three pricing hypothe- 
ses requires a different calibration so as  to replicate quantities and  values 
contained in base data. 
In the case of  normal initial profits (+ = 0), to incorporate fixed costs 
while replicating observed prices and quantities in the CRTS case, we reduce 
the primary variable cost component to total costs by  the amount of  fixed 
costs. In the case of monopolistic competition, equation (2) is also solved to 
yield the value of the conjecture R.  This implies that the conjecture is in fact 
calibrated.12  Hence we denote the calibrated conjecture by 6.  The calibrated 
values of 6  appear in table 10.4 below. 
In the presence of supernormal profits, we allocate fixed costs as before and 
then, given the profit rate + and all quantities and foreign prices, we solve for 
the  domestic price  vector  PD  which  satisfies the  firm’s profitability con- 
straint.I3 As before, the value of 6  is obtained from equation (2)  but with the 
new set of domestic prices. 
For the seven sectors in the present aggregation, table 10.2 gives the com- 
position of sectoral output, exports and imports. Also included are estimates 
for (1) elasticity of  capitaUlabor substitution; (2)  import price elasticities of 
demand; (3) export supply price elasticities. The last column of  table  10.2 
gives the value of the calibrated price elasticity of demand, ‘C  . 
12. An equivalent approach is to read in Cournot conjectures and calibrate for N,,  the Cournot- 
equivalent number of firms. An alternative (but in our view less appealing) approach is to solve 
for marginal costs or demand elasticities, both of which are likely to be more reliable information 
than conjectures.  In any case, the system of  eqs. (2) and (3) can only deliver two of the three 
variables a,  N, and  C . 
13. Because of  interindustry-relationships, this calibration involves solving simultaneously for 
the vector of  domestic prices, PD. Table 10.2  Structure of Production, Trade, and Elasticity Values 
Price 
Elasticity of 
Imports/  Elasticity of  Export  Import  Nominal  Demand for 
Share in Gross  Exports/  Domestic  Substitution  Supply  Elasticity  Tariff  Domestic 
Output  Output  Sales  in Production  Elasticity’  of Demand’  Rateb  Sales 
(x)  (Elm  (MID)  (UP)  (4  (my)  (tm)  (E) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Primary  8.9%  4.9%  64.4%  2.5  0.75  1.8  59.7  - 
Food processing  9.6  2.5  6.7  1.5  I .5  2.5  18.4  - 
Consumer goods  14.4  32.5  11.2  1 .o  1.5  2.4  15.7  1.49 
Producer goods  20.1  16.6  19.7  0.9  I .5  2.2  17.6  1.30 
Heavy industry  7.7  31.9  47.3  0.9  1.5  1.9  28.3  1.31 
Traded services  13.2  24.4  6.1  1.5  1.5  2.0  0.0 
Nontraded services  26.1 
- 
-  -  0.9  -  0.4  -  - 
ahcome  compensated price elasticity of export supply (import demand). 
bNominal  tariff rate includes an estimate of tariff equivalent protection conferred by existing nontariff barriers. 298  Jaime de Melo and David Roland-Holst 
10.4  Simulation Results 
The simulations consist of the abolition of the import protection Korea had 
in  1982, the year for the most recent input-output table. Column (7) in table 
10.2 gives the nominal tariff structure of  Korea in  that year. The protection 
rates reported here are based on direct comparisons of domestic and interna- 
tional prices. Hence they include tariff equivalent protection by existing non- 
tariff measures, and are as reliable an estimate of protection as one is likely to 
obtain. The most notable feature of the tariff structure displayed in column (4) 
is the high protection conferred on the primary sector. This reflects Korea's 
tradition of protecting its agricultural sector. 
Tables 10.3 and 10.4 report the welfare and sectoral resource pull effects of 
removing protection under the pricing alternatives described above. To  facili- 
tate interpretation of  results,  we  compare them  with  those obtained under 
CRTS. Recall that for the cases with IRTS, the three sectors with increasing 
returns are consumer goods, producer goods, and heavy industry. Simulations 
are for two sets of parameter values describing unexploited economies of scale 
in the base solution. For the case of low economies of  scale, we  assume for 
all three sectors a cost-disadvantage ratio (CDR) of 0.10, which is thought to 
be a conservative value for Korean manufacturing. For the case of  medium/ 
high economies of  scale, a cost-disadvantage ratio of 0.20 is assumed. Each 
set of CDRs is applied to the three pricing rules described earlier. For profits, 
we also assume two alternatives. In the first, normal profits (a = 0) are as- 
Table 10.3  Aggregate Welfare Effects of Ttade Liberalization 
Monopolistic Competition 
Contestable 
Market  No EntryiExit  EntryiExit 
CRTS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Cost Disadvantage Ratioa  0.0  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.20 
% of Base-Year National Income 
Equivalent variation (EV)b  1.1 
Scale efficiency gain (SE)'  0.0 
?r=o  2.6  5.3  2.1  4.7  -0.6  2.8 
71 = 10%  4.9  10.2  2.5  5.2  I .6  6.0 
r=O  1.3  3.4  0.8  3.0  -  1.4  1.5 
n = 10%  2.0  5.8  0.7  2.5  -0.4  2.9 
~~  ~  ~ 
'CDR  = 1 -  MCIAC. 
bEV  = C [IU (f,,  Yl,)f,] - C[IU (f,,Yo], where  C is the cost function associated with  the  indirect 
utility function (IU) corresponding to the LES utility function describing consumer choice. 
= [TC (Po,  X,) -  TC (f,,  X,)]/GDPo  is a vector of product and factor prices, and GDP, is real GDP 
prior to the removal of protection. 299  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 




Market  No EntryiExit  EntryiExit 
CRTS  a=O  a=10  n=O  a=10  a=O  P=IO 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Consumer goods: 
X  12.4  19.0  31.7  10.0  9.4  6.9  22.7 
E  25.1  34.9  57.9  20.7  21.3  17.4  45.3 
SE  1.6  1.9  0.3  0.3  -  1.8  -0.1 
B  0.9  0.9  0.8  1.4 
R  0.2  0.4 
N  25.8  23.8 
X  12.9  17.2  26.5  12.9  10.9  10.1  18.8 
E  40.1  48.2  69.9  39.9  37.8  36.6  55.8 
SE  I .6  2.0  0.6  0.4  -  1.1  -0.4 
f1  0.2  0.3 
N  21.6  24. I 
X  -  1.7  -5.1  8.4  -3.3  -  1.7  -5.5  4.3 
E  9.7  2.8  23.8  6.9  10.3  4.6  19.5 
SE  -0.6  0.7  -0.1  0.0  -  1.8  -  1.0 
B  2.6  2.6  2.5  3.1 
n  0.2  0.3 
N  10.7  17.0 
No&: X  = gross output; E = exports; SE = scale efficiency measure (see table  10.3) expressed as a 
percentage of sectoral sales at current prices;  E  = elasticity of demand (defined in eq. (31); R  = cali- 
brated conjecture;  N = number of  firms (initially set equal to  1). 
Producer goods: 
B  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2 
Heavy industry: 
sumed, regardless of  whether there is protection. In the second case, in line 
with the pattern of  PCM values described in section 10.2, we  assume that a 
supernormal profit rate of  10 percent (IT  = 10) is achievable under protection 
because of the barriers to entry from restricted foreign competition. 
Two measures of the gains/losses from removing protection are reported in 
table 10.3. The equivalent variation (EV) measure is derived from the indirect 
utility (IU) function associated with the Stone-Geary utility function assumed 
for final demand. EV is an aggregate measure of both efficiency gains in pro- 
duction and in consumption. It measures how  much the representative con- 
sumer would have to be compensated, at the new set of prices, to be indiffer- 
ent to the bundle of goods now available at the initial set of prices. The second 
measure is the scale efficiency gain/loss (SE) from moving along the average 
cost curve. Like EV,  SE evaluates the new output level at old prices, so that 
the measure controls for shifts in the average cost curve induced by  changes 
in factor and product prices. 300  Jaime de Melo and David Roland-Holst 
Figure 10.2 illustrates the measure of  scale efficiency change used in table 
10.3. Prior to removing protection, the observed cost output combination is 
(Co,X,,).  As a result of the removal of protection, relative product and factor 
prices change,  leading to a shift in the cost curve. Consider two cases. In 
figure 10.2, panel A, there is output expansion, leading to an estimated scale 
efficiency gain indicated by the shaded area. In contrast, in panel B there is 
output contraction and, therefore, a scale efficiency loss, again indicated by 
the shaded area. In  both cases,  the scale efficiency change is measured by 
evaluating the cost function at the initial vector of  product and factor prices. 
The measure (SE) reported in table 10.3 is the sum of the sectoral gains and 
losses. 
Table  10.3 expresses both EV  and  SE as a percentage of  initial national 
income (GDP). In the reference case of CRTS, liberalization yields a 1.1 per- 
cent increase in welfare (col. 1). Because there are no scale efficiency effects, 
the welfare gain under CRTS is the sum of  the traditional producer and con- 
sumer surplus gains from removing distortions. 
Now compare this result with the corresponding estimate under contestable 
market pricing. In this specification there is no firm entry, so scale efficiency 
gains/losses vary directly with sectoral output. Sectors that expand (contract) 
will achieve scale economy gains (losses). In the case of  no initial supernor- 
mal profits, welfare gains are higher than under CRTS because, on average, 
sectors with IRTS expand as a result of removing protection. This is so be- 
cause resources are pulled out of  the heavily protected primary  sector into 
industry, where three out of the five sectors have IRTS. 
As expected, welfare gains are greater the greater the degree of unrealized 
scale economies. Doubling the value of CDR approximately doubles the over- 
all  welfare gain,  although it  almost triples the  associated scale efficiency 
gains. Note also that the EV measure under IRTS is greater than the sum of 
the EV measure under CRTS and the corresponding SE measure. This is so 
because there is a further gain as average cost pricing comes closer to marginal 
cost pricing. 
When  trade  liberalization eliminates  supernormal profits  (IT  = 10 per- 
cent), welfare and scale efficiency gains increase substantially. This is one 
aspect of  the pro-competitive effect of  trade liberalization (the other appears 
in the form of  a higher elasticity of  demand in the monopolistic competition 
model; see table 10.4). For example, with the combination (CDR = 10 per- 
cent, IT  = 10 percent), EV  = 4.9 percent of GDP, Compared with the case 
of no initial profits (EV = 2.6 percent of GDP), the greater welfare gain can 
be decomposed into two components: the first is the scale efficiency gain (2.0 
percent versus 1.1 percent) as firms expand more because they can no longer 
price restrictively. The second component is again due to the welfare gains of 
pricing  closer  to  marginal  costs.  This  effect  is  about  1.8 = 4.9 
-  (1.1 + 2.0) percent of  initial GDP.  In the not  implausible combination 301  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
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(CDR  = 20 percent,  TI = 10 percent),  welfare gains from trade liberaliza- 
tion are estimated at 10.2 percent of GDP. 
The monopolistic competition  case is more complicated,  since there are 
three additional adjustment mechanisms that affect the calculated welfare gain 
measure.  First,  there may  be firm entry/exit to attain exogenously specified 
profit rates. A second factor is the endogeneity of oligopoly behavior, an effect 
we consider later.  As firms enter (exit),  incumbents adapt their conjectures 
and price less (more) competitively. Third, but apparently less significant,  is 
the pro-competitive effect that is due to trade liberalization raising the elastic- 
ity of sectoral domestic demand, C  (see table 10.4).14 
Compare contestable market pricing and monopolistic competition with no 
entryiexit  (cols. 4 and  5). In the  contestable  market  case, scale efficiency 
gains are higher because firms expand output to maintain or to achieve zero 
profits. On the other hand, in the monopolistic competition case, with no en- 
try/exit, firms may make profits, realizing lower scale efficiency gains. At the 
same time, profits reduce welfare gains as prices diverge further from mar- 
ginal costs. These two factors explain why welfare gains are larger under con- 
testable market pricing. The larger difference in welfare gains for the specifi- 
cation with positive profits in the base results from substantially greater output 
expansion to achieve the necessary price reductions after the removal of pro- 
tection. 
Now consider firm entry, which exerts a crowding effect that diminishes the 
overall scale efficiency gain (this is the effect analyzed in Horstmann and Mar- 
kusen  1986). In the case of CDR  = 0.10, this effect dominates the positive 
output effect of  liberalization  on scale efficiency, so that  overall  scale effi- 
ciency is reduced.I5 By contrast, with CDR  = 0.20, average sectoral output 
expands more than the firm population and scale efficiency is increased. In the 
case of  zero initial profits,  the scale efficiency loss is large enough to offset 
the other welfare gains from trade liberalization. 
When there are profits in the initial situation, as before, there is a gain from 
moving closer to marginal cost pricing with trade liberalization. However, two 
other effects are also at work. On the one hand, more firm entry is required to 
eliminate excess profits, with  its deleterious effect on scale efficiency. How- 
ever, there is a counterbalancing effect as firm entry leads to more competitive 
behavior.  The net result is that  scale efficiency improves  more and that the 
overall welfare gain is greater than in the zero initial profit scenario. Since we 
have not taken direct account of increased product variety on  welfare,  these 
results may understate the benefits of increased competition. 
Table 10.4 summarizes the microeconomic results from removing protec- 
tion for the sectors with IRTS and a CDR value of 0.10. The table also dis- 
14. This effect is also discussed by Devarajan and Rodnk (1989b). 
15. The reduction in scale efficiency obtained here also occurs for certain parameter configura- 
tions in the theoretical models of Krugrnan (1984). Snape (1977), and Venables (1985). 303  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
plays the value of h,  which suggests that all three sectors are more competi- 
tive than Cournot. For each of the three sectors with IRTS, exports expand, 
even though under most  scenarios output contracts for heavy  industry (the 
most protected sector after agriculture). The reasons for export expansion de- 
spite output contraction is that removing protection leads to a real exchange 
rate depreciation, a general equilibrium effect. 
Consumer and producer goods follow similar patterns: with n = 0, expan- 
sion is greatest under contestable mark-up pricing and least under monopolis- 
tic competition with CRTS in the middle. The reason for a stronger expansion 
under contestable market pricing is the absence of firm entry that impedes the 
realization  of  economies  of  scale.  Interestingly,  the  scale  efficiency  loss 
caused by  firm entry (the number of  firms increases by  between 21 and 25 
percent) can dampen output expansion below that achieved under CRTS when 
7~ = 0. Compare columns (6) and (1) in the case of consumer goods, where 
firm entry is greatest and  scale efficiency loss greatest.  Output expansion 
under monopolistic competition is only half that achieved under CRTS. There 
are two reasons for this smaller output expansion. First, the higher price for 
domestic sales resulting from less efficient scale means less demand for do- 
mestic consumer goods (and greater demand for imported consumer goods). 
Second, because of  interindustry linkages, under monopolistic competition 
production costs go  up  in  sectors that are intensive purchasers of  producer 
goods and heavy industry. 
When protection alters market structure by allowing for supernormal profits 
(cols. 3 and 3,  removing protection leads to a magnification effect on re- 
source pulls. The magnification effect is stronger under monopolistic compe- 
tition for consumer and producer goods than under contestable market pric- 
ing. For heavy industry, the (exogenous) pro-competitive effect of eliminating 
profits is sufficient to compensate for the negative resource pull effect of elim- 
inating protection. This example illustrates the possibility that  sectors that 
would be predicted to contract because of  liberalization expand instead be- 
cause they become more competitive. Even in this highly aggregated model, 
a ranking of sectors in ascending order of effective protection would thus not 
be an accurate ranking of comparative advantage. 
The other pro-competitive effect  of  trade liberalization comes from the 
greater elasticity of demand facing firms after protection is eliminated. For the 
functional forms specified here, the results in table 10.4 indicate that this ef- 
fect is small. However, one cannot judge the likely importance of this effect 
from the simulations reported here, since constant substitution elasticities are 
maintained throughout. Changes in the values of  E are entirely accounted for 
by  changes in import (and domestic) shares in final and intermediate demand. 
So far, all the results for the monopolistic competition case are with exoge- 
nous conjecture. We  have seen that firm entry to eliminate profits reduces the 
welfare gains of  trade  liberalization because of  less scale efficiency gain. 
Moving to the assumption of endogenous conjecture (eq. [5])  increases scale 304  Jaime de Melo and David Roland-Holst 
efficiency because incumbent firms price more competitively as new  firms 
enter. As a result, welfare gains under the monopolistic competition scenario 
with endogenous conjectures (not reported here) are between those obtained 
under contestable market pricing and those obtained under monopolistic com- 
petition with exogenous conjectures. 
10.5  Conclusions 
This paper has developed a simulation model to evaluate the welfare effects 
of trade liberalization. In contrast with previous general equilibrium simula- 
tion  exercises,  this  paper  decomposes the  welfare  effects of  trade  policy 
changes into its various components. Although the calibrated simulation ex- 
ercise for Korea relies on judgmental parameter values to represent demand 
and supply elasticities, evidence on the links between trade policies, industrial 
structure, and industrial organization policies in Korea provides good support 
for the alternative modeling approaches adopted here. The estimated gains 
from trade liberalization were found to be quite sensitive to the specification 
of firm pricing behavior in the three manufacturing sectors with IRTS. 
In the benchmark case of across-the-board CRTS, elimination of protection 
yields a welfare gain of  1.1 percent of  GDP. This gain represents the tradi- 
tional production and consumption costs of  protection. Under IRTS and no 
firm entry, net scale efficiency gains (scale efficiency gains in consumer goods 
and producer goods coupled with  scale efficiency losses in heavy industry) 
give an additional gain between 1.3 and 3.4 percent of GDP, depending on the 
extent of  unrealized economies of  scale. If  it is recognized, as the evidence 
suggests, that protection allowed Korean conglomerates to act collusively in 
their sales on the domestic market, one would obtain an additional welfare 
gain of between 1.3 and 4.9 percent of GDP, thereby yielding a total gain of 
between 5 percent of GDP if unexploited economies of scale are small and 10 
percent of  GDP if  they are in a range commonly attributed to them in this 
country (a cost disadvantage ratio of 20 percent). 
Welfare gain estimates are, however, much lower if the contestable market 
scenario is replaced by one with the assumption of monopolistic competition, 
even if one recognizes that firm entry/exit may occur. Under the monopolistic 
competition scenario where liberalization is accompanied by  firm entry, the 
number of firms increases by between 10 and 25 percent in sectors with IRTS. 
Trade liberalization results in scale efficiency losses. In  some cases there is 
sufficient entry to yield a net aggregate welfare loss if firms are not allowed to 
make excess profits under protection. If firms are allowed to earn supernormal 
profits under protection, aggregate welfare gains are between 1.6 and 6.0 per- 
cent of GDP. 
In the Korean example, trade liberalization would favor industry since ag- 
riculture is the most heavily protected sector. In many other semi-industrial 
countries, elimination of protection would involve a resource shift out of man- 305  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
ufacturing. A case in point is Chile, where trade liberalization involved a rel- 
ative expansion of agriculture. In this case, scale efficiency gains would only 
be achieved if  the elimination of protection were accompanied by  firm exit, 
and the scale efficiency gains of  trade liberalization would  be greater in a 
world of monopolistic competition than in one of contestable market pricing. 
However, the competitive effects of trade liberalization could be even greater 
than those estimated here. 
It should be apparent from this summary description of the results that the 
welfare cost estimates of protection are quite sensitive to the specification of 
market structure and conduct and, in particular, to the firm entry/exit patterns 
accompanying trade liberalization. In the Korean case, estimates of the gains 
from trade liberalization are much larger under IRTS than under CRTS, if 
inefficient firm entry is forestalled while the competitive discipline imposed 
by greater import competition is maintained on the domestic market. 
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Comment  Dani Rodrik 
It has now become commmonplace to point out that the markets of developing 
countries are rife  with  imperfect competition  and unexploited  scale econo- 
mies, on account of which trade liberalization can either go horribly wrong or 
magnify the conventional gains from trade. Since sensible theoretical models 
Dani Rodrik is an  associate professor of  public policy at  Harvard University and  a faculty 
research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 307  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
can be constructed to demonstrate the possibility of either outcome, we must 
rely on empirical evidence to fortify our intuition regarding likely scenarios. 
The problem is that empirical evidence is hard to come by  and even harder to 
interpret. Very  few developing countries have undertaken genuine and sub- 
stantial import liberalization prior to the 1980s; and the more recent cases are 
too fresh to yield much evidence. With regard to the few cases of  genuine 
liberalization there is the thorny issue of how to disentangle the effects of the 
macroeconomic context from trade policy proper. 
While numerical simulation exercises perhaps ought not count as empirical 
evidence, they are nonetheless useful in sharpening our intuition about the 
range of possible outcomes. General equilibrium models of developing coun- 
tries that are sensitive to market structure issues can be counted with the fin- 
gers of one hand. Therefore, the marginal value of the type of exercise carried 
out by  de Melo and Roland-Holst is quite high.  In  this case, unlike  with 
partial-equilibrium simulation exercises applied to the trade problems of ad- 
vanced industrial countries, we have not yet reached a point of  sharply dimin- 
ishing returns. 
The basic story told in the paper is sensible and, in its broad outlines, would 
appear to be robust to minor changes in calibration and specification. In Ko- 
rea, trade protection in the early 1980s favored the primary sector (agricul- 
ture) over industry. Consequently, we expect trade liberalization to direct re- 
sources toward industry. Now,  since it is industry where excess profits and 
unexploited scale economies reside, such resource pulls would tend to mag- 
nify the conventional gains from liberalization. And this is generally the out- 
come in the scenarios labeled “contestable markets.” The fly in the ointment 
comes with the conjectural variations model under free entry. The increased 
profitability  of  the manufacturing sectors attracts entry, which is disadvanta- 
geous in view of  the duplication of  fixed costs. With  such entry, the scale 
diseconomies can be large enough to outweigh the conventional gains from 
liberalization. 
Fortunately, the actual behavior of the South Korean economy tends to rule 
out the second scenario. In a comparison of  the Korean economy with Tai- 
wan’s, Tibor Scitovsky presents the following striking facts: between  1966 
and  1976, the number of  manufacturing firms in Taiwan increased by  150 
percent while the number of  employees per firm increased by  29 percent; in 
Korea, the number of  firms increased only by  10 percent, while average firm 
size increased by  176 percent.I It would appear that the last thing one needs 
to worry about in Korea is the threat of excessive entry. Hence, I would have 
preferred to see the model run under the assumption of no entry/exit, espe- 
cially since the authors spend considerable effort to motivate the presence of 
excess profits in Korean industry. 
1. Tibor Scitovsky, “Economic Development in Taiwan and  Korea,  1965-81,”  in Models  of 
Development: A Comparative Study of  Economic Growth in South Korea and Taiwan, ed. Law- 
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Related  to this  last  point, the authors’  liberalization experiments in fact 
combine two conceptually  separate shocks: one, the conventional  shock, is 
the elimination of all tariffs; the other, the unconventional one, is the reduction 
of all excess profits to zero. Now, the whole point of having a structural model 
of imperfect competition is to determine the level of profits (i.e., price-cost 
margins) endogenously. Within the context of the authors’ model, there is no 
reason why trade liberalization on its own should drive excess profits to zero, 
since domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes for each other. Im- 
posing a zero-profit  condition  under liberalization amounts to comparing a 
short-run  equilibrium  under  protection  (with  excess  profits)  to  a  long-run 
equilibrium under free trade  (with zero profits).  This may  not be quite the 
right comparison. If, contrary to the evidence, one is willing to believe in free 
entry, one may  still want  to compare the long-run equilibria under the two 
policy regimes. 
There are also difficulties in interpreting the contestable-markets scenario. 
First, the assumption of increasing returns to scale has the implication under 
this scenario that the entire manufacturing sector in Korea contains only three 
firms, one each in producer goods, consumer goods, and heavy industry. Ko- 
rean industry may be highly concentrated, but perhaps not to that extent. Sec- 
ond, the assumption of excess profits sits ill at ease with the assumption of 
contestability. Perhaps the incumbents have a cost advantage that accounts for 
these profits;  but then  why  would  these profits necessarily go to zero as a 
result of trade liberalization? 
Another unconventional feature of the model is that the conjectural varia- 
tion parameter is endogenized by making it proportional to the inverse of the 
number  of  firms.  Given the  inherent difficulties with  conjectural-variations 
models, this compounds interpretational problems. And it does not appear to 
be necessary.  Even if the cleaner Cournot assumption is made, the fact that 
the price-cost margin of the representative firm is decreasing in the number of 
firms ensures the result that the authors are most interested in obtaining: the 
reduction in profits with entry. 
In conclusion,  this  is an instructive paper from which  we learn that the 
structure of  protection  in  Korea  has  probably  pulled  resources  away  from 
manufacturing industries where they could have contributed to the further re- 
alization  of  scale economies. Some of  the  unconventional  features  of  the 
model notwithstanding,  this is a useful lesson.  But as de Melo and Roland- 
Holst also stress, its relevance to other developing countries may be limited as 
the typical pattern of protection in these countries is biased in favor of, and 
not against, industry. 309  Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization 
Comment  Marie Thursby 
de Melo and Roland-Holst use a seven-sector CGE model to examine the ef- 
fects of trade liberalization in South Korea. Four sectors exhibit perfect com- 
petition with constant returns to scale, and three (consumer goods, producer 
goods, and heavy industries) are imperfectly competitive with increasing re- 
turns to scale (IRTS). The question addressed is whether liberalization ration- 
alizes production in the IRTS sectors. With protectionist policies, such sectors 
may be characterized by too many firms producing at a relatively high average 
cost. If liberalization leads to an increase in firm size (hence, a lower average 
total  cost),  then  production is rationalized, but if  equilibrium firm size is 
smaller after liberalization, derationalization occurs. 
The authors argue effectively that Korea is an ideal case to study since gov- 
ernment policies in the 1970s led to an oligopolistic industry structure with 
unexploited scale economies. The Korean case is an interesting one, and a 
general equilibrium approach is clearly the appropriate one for this case. With 
the high degree of Korean agricultural protection, one would expect the major 
impacts of  trade liberalization on the IRTS sectors to be general equilibrium 
effects. Because of this, it would be nice if  the authors were to give us more 
information related to these effects. In particular (and, as the authors state), 
rationalization is a function of factor price changes and, hence, resource pulls 
across sectors. It would be easier to interpret the rationalization effects if  we 
knew the factor price changes implied by  each of  the simulations. For ex- 
ample, a change in factor prices will shift the average cost curves of  firms, 
while liberalization per se will have a pro-competitive effect on the perceived 
elasticity of  demand. Each of  these will affect rationalization, so that infor- 
mation about factor price changes can be useful in sorting out the two effects. 
It would also be nice to see some sensitivity analysis other than that done 
for scale economies. Besides sensitivity to the elasticities of  substitution in 
production, sensitivity to the elasticity of  substitution in  consumption (and 
hence, demand elasticities) is of  interest. Sensitivity analyses in other CGE 
studies of trade liberalization with imperfect competition have shown the re- 
sults can be quite sensitive to the elasticity of substitution in consumption.’ 
The most interesting aspect of the paper, but the most disappointing in some 
respects, concerns the effects of  market structure on rationalization. The au- 
thors do a good job of relating rationalization to the degree of  unexploited 
scale economies and to entry and exit. They also show that assumptions about 
profit margins and firm behavior are important in determining welfare effects. 
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Unfortunately,  the market assumptions used are a bit ad hoc. In these models 
N  identical firms are assumed to produce a homogeneous commodity, and a 
conjectural variation model is used to proxy effects of  product differentiation 
among firms within the country.  The only product differentiation allowed is 
at the national  level  by employing the Armington  assumption  (both on the 
import and export side). Since firm product differentiation would imply intra- 
industry  trade, it would  yield  different  results  in terms of  intersectoral re- 
source pulls with trade liberalization.  In the case of  Canada-U.S. trade liber- 
alization,  Brown  and Stern show that  the two types of  differentiation  have 
dramatically different effects.2 In all fairness, de Melo and Roland-Holst do 
note the limitations of  the Armington assumption. Since market structure ap- 
pears to be an important feature of  the analysis, a more explicit approach to 
modeling behavior would have been preferable. 
2. Ibid. 